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[EDITOR'S NOTE: Following is
Part I of a two-part feature article on
citizens' utility boards. Part II will be
published as the feature article in the
Summer 1991 issue of the California
Regulatory Law Reporter. Both parts
are condensed from a longer report pub-
lished by CPIL in 1991.]
INTRODUCTION
"Citizens' Utility Boards." The name
sounds benign enough, especially when
shortened to its commonly used
acronym, CUB. The concept-the cre-
ation of organized advocacy groups to
give consumers a voice in the regulatory
proceedings which control monopoly
utilities-is certainly consistent with the
American goal of citizen representation
in governmental decisionmaking. Yet
CUBs have been the focus of acrimo-
nious debates and precedent-setting
legal struggles that have stretched from
state regulatory commissions to the
United States Supreme Court.
CUBs empower utility ratepayers by
organizing them into democratically
governed advocacy groups. They give
consumers an effective voice in regula-
tory proceedings concerning utilities by
arming them with the kind of expertise
normally afforded only by the utilities,
state regulatory commissions and gov-
ernment intervenors. In other words,
CUBs allow consumers to be "players"
in utility rate proceedings. As such,
CUBs present a counterbalance to the
regulated monopolies which bring elec-
tricity, gas and telephone services into
our homes. They provide a forum for
residential ratepayers to coordinate their
efforts, control rates and establish poli-
cies that benefit consumers.
CUBs are voluntary organizations
that make no use of tax dollars. They are
not affiliated with any government agen-
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cies or private interests. Rather, they are
nonprofit corporations funded primarily
by membership contributions. In addi-
tion to representing consumers in utility
proceedings before regulatory agencies,
CUBs educate consumers on a variety of
issues, from the complexities of the rate-
setting process to ways consumers can
conserve energy and cut energy bills.
CUBs are a product of the consumer
movement spurred by Ralph Nader and
other consumer activists in the late
1960s and 1970s. In 1980 the first CUB
opened its doors in Wisconsin. The early
1980s saw the formation of additional
CUBs in California, Illinois and Oregon.
At that time CUBs were also on the
drawing boards in several other states,
including Massachusetts, New York,
Missouri, Kansas and Florida.
Historically, the heart of the CUB
concept is the use of the "extra space" in
utility billing envelopes to communicate
with ratepayers-to inform them about
upcoming rate hearings, encourage them
to participate in regulatory proceedings,
and invite them to join CUB and con-
tribute funds toward its advocacy work.
The architects of the CUB concept saw
the importance of communicating direct-
ly with all ratepayers on a regular basis.
They also recognized the necessity of
creating a funding mechanism that
would maintain CUBs' independence
from government agencies, legislative
bodies and corporate interests, as well as
ensure an adequate and relatively stable
source of revenue.
When CUBs were authorized in Wis-
consin, Illinois and California, they were
granted bill enclosure privileges-
Wisconsin (1979) and Illinois (1983)
through legislation, and California
(1983) through Public Utilities Commis-
sion action. CUBs' use of the extra space
in monthly utility bills to solicit mem-
berships proved to be extremely effec-
tive. All three organizations attracted
enough members to establish viable
organizations and begin advocating for
ratepayers' interests in phenomenally
short periods of time. Each was opera-
tional within a year of the first billing
insert.
A utility court challenge in California
culminated in a 1986 U.S. Supreme
Court decision which struck down the
use of bill inserts by consumer groups on
first amendment grounds., As a result,
CUBs lost a powerful means of raising
funds and organizing consumers. How-
ever, the four CUBs created prior to
1986 have weathered the storm, saving
consumers literally billions of dollars in
utility bills and contributing to the for-
mation of consumer-beneficial public
policies governing utility practices. In
the most recent illustration of the vitality
of the CUB concept, despite the loss of
utility bill access, New York Governor
Mario Cuomo signed an executive order
in January 1991 which paves the way for
the formation of the fifth CUB.
This report describes the historical
development of CUBs and examines the
effects CUBs have had in representing
consumers against the considerable pow-
er and resources of utilities (Part I). It
analyzes alternate means of raising funds
and suggests ways in which CUBs can
continue to form and operate despite the
limitations resulting from the loss of util-
ity billing envelopes as a means of com-
municating with consumers (Part II).
THE HISTORY OF CUB
DEVELOPMENT
Administrative proceedings to estab-
lish utility rate structures and operating
policies have become increasingly com-
plex. The often time-consuming process-
es require the expertise of economists,
engineers and attorneys. None come
cheaply.
Residential ratepayers have typically
been left out of the bargaining process.
The funding required to finance effective
participation in regulatory proceedings is
often beyond the means of consumer
groups, much less individual consumers.
Many states have recognized the need
for consumer representation by estab-
lishing advocacy offices. However, con-
sumer representation by government
agencies is generally restricted due to
limited staff and resources, and even
political constraints.
Utilities, on the other hand, are not
restrained by limited funds and inade-
quate expertise. They typically spend
hundreds of thousands, sometimes mil-
lions, of ratepayer dollars per case to
defend their interests. Utilities' funding
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for advocating their own interests is ful-
ly allowed as a cost of operation and is
involuntarily assessed on ratepayers.
"Prudency" standards to limit such utili-
ty advocacy or to require that it be
financed from profits (by stockholders
whose interests the utility represents in
its advocacy) have not yet been estab-
lished either by regulation or legislation.
Hence, utility funding of its own advo-
cacy in ratemaking and other regulatory
proceedings has few limitations.
This section discusses the types of
consumer advocacy that have evolved to
redress the imbalance in utility regulato-
ry proceedings. It looks at the consumer
representation provided by government
proxies as well as the efforts of citizens
groups. The section concludes with an
analysis of the key players and rulings
that led to the formation of citizens' util-
ity boards.
Types of Consumer Advocacy
Public utilities operate as monopolies
and exist with the sanction and protec-
tion of the state. To safeguard the public
from any harm that could occur because
of the monopoly advantage, the state is
charged with regulating the utilities. The
state's role in both sanctioning utilities
and protecting ratepayers from potential
monopoly abuse poses a dilemma for the
regulatory agency. On the one hand, it
must protect the interests of consumers
by ensuring adequate service at reason-
able rates. On the other, it is constitu-
tionally required to guarantee a fair rate
of return for the utilities and their share-
holders.2
Regulatory agencies, called public
utility commissions or public service
commissions in most states, convene
formal proceedings in order to establish
rates and set policies. Such proceedings
are intended to be quasi-judicial in
nature, with the interests of all affected
parties-the utility, its ratepayers and the
regulatory agency-brought before the
commissioners deliberately and compre-
hensively. The utilities bring consider-
able resources to regulatory proceedings,
vigorously representing the interests of
their stockholders with the expertise of
their full-time attorneys, rate analysts
and specialists. Residential ratepayers,
however, rarely-some would say nev-
er-obtain the benefit of representation
on an equal footing with the utilities. As
a group, they are inherently unorganized
and lack both the expertise and funding
to adequately represent their collective
interests.3
Government Proxy Representation.
Many states have attempted to balance
consumers' interests before regulatory
proceedings by creating offices that rep-
resent ratepayers. Three forms of "proxy
advocates" have evolved to redress this
imbalance: (1) a separate division within
the public utilities commission, (2) a unit
within the state attorney general's office,
or (3) an independent consumer counsel
in a separate state agency or office.
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Many such ratepayer proxies were
established in the 1970s, called the
"golden era of institutional reform" by
political scientist William Gormley.5
Reformers on the state and federal levels
established a number of measures to
open up the regulatory process to citi-
zens and prod bureaucracies to be more
responsive to their constituents. Reforms
instituted in the 1970s include "freedom
of information" or public records
statutes, requirements for public hear-
ings in administrative proceedings, sun-
shine laws and, as discussed above, the
establishment of proxy advocates for cit-
izens unable to represent themselves.
The least common remedy among the
states is a division within the public utili-
ties commission which represents
ratepayers' interests.6 In California, for
example, the Public Utilities Commis-
sion established the Division of Ratepay-
er Advocates (DRA) in 1986 to represent
consumers in regulatory proceedings.7
Residential and small business ratepay-
ers in West Virginia are represented by
the Consumer Advocate Division of the
Public Service Commission. In both cas-
es, some attempt is made-either for-
mally or informally-to insulate the
in-house division of consumer represen-
tation from influences by the commis-
sioners.8
A more common alternative to a divi-
sion within the public utilities commis-
sion is an office in the attorney general's
office, usually within a consumer protec-
tion division, which advocates on behalf
of utility customers. Such consumer ep-
resentation is available in approximately
18 states.9 In some states, attorneys gen-
eral are charged with reprcsenting state
agencies as well as the interests of the
public.
Approximately 20 states have estab-
lished independent consumer offices to
represent ratepayers, separate from the.
public utilities commission and the attor-
ney general's office. 10 Consumer counsel
are usually appointed by the governor.
Most such. offices are funded by legisla-
tive appropriation, although some
receive a portion or all of their funding
from assessments on utilities. A majority
of consumer counsel offices are charged
with representing all consumers in pub-
lic utility commission proceedings-res-
idential, commercial and industrial
ratepayers. Most are empowered to rep-
resent consumers before the courts and
federal agencies in addition to the state's
regulatory commission.
The presence of ratepayer advocates
within state government is a great step
forward for utility customers. Full-time
expertise, charged with watching out for
consumers' interests, has added a dimen-
sion to regulatory proceedings that had
previously been absent. However, gov-
ernment proxies representing the inter-
ests of ratepayers are not without their
drawbacks. Whether located within the
regulatory agency, the attorney general's
office or an independent agency, they
usually lack sufficient funding and staff
resources to carry out a comprehensive
program of consumer advocacy across a
broad spectrum of concerns. They must
therefore pick their issues quite selec-
tively. As agencies that are statewide in
scope, proxy advocates are inclined to
aggregate their support, often concen-
trating their efforts on proceedings with
the broadest impact and ignoring those
which affect smaller interests. More sig-
nificantly, government proxies are sub-
ject to political and other pressures con-
trary to the interests of those they
purportedly represent." Perhaps the
greatest handicap of government proxies
is their inability to organize grassroots
consumer involvement in regulatory
issues. In addition, many are prohibited
from lobbying for consumer-beneficial
legislation unless specifically asked to
testify before the legislative body.
Of the three types of government
proxies, ratepayer representation within
the regulatory commission is most trou-
blesome from the standpoint of political
pressure. Despite attempts to insulate in-
house ratepayer advocates from the deci-
sionmakers, the potential exists for
consumer staff to view the commission-
ers-not the ratepayers-as their con-
stituency. In the case of California, a fur-
ther drawback to locating the ratepayer
advocacy office within the Public Utili-
ties Commission is that it lacks standing
to appeal decisions of its own Commis-
sion to the courts.12 The DRA may theo-
retically be independent within the agen-
cy, but it is still part of it and is therefore
bound by the final decision of the Com-
mission. Even though the ratepayer
advocacy office offers consumers some
form of representation in utility proceed-
ings, any benefit which may befall con-
sumers is ultimately short-changed
because of the DRA's inability to appeal
the Commission's decisions before the
California Supreme Court. Since only
the utilities are effectively able to
appeal, experts believe that, over time,
the law bends inequitably in the direc-
tion of the utility.
3
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While generally superior to placing
consumer advocacy within the commis-
sion, ratepayer representation within the
attorney general's office is fraught with
some of the same difficulties. In states
where attorneys general are charged
with representing state agencies as well
as the public, there may well exist con-
flicts of interest in carrying out the dual
roles. The attorney general's office could
view its most important function as rep-
resenting state agencies, to the exclusion
or at least the detriment of consumer
representation. In states where the attor-
ney general is elected (a majority of
states), political considerations are likely
to take precedence over consumer inter-
ests. Interparty conflicts often frame the
issues, rather than the needs of various
consumer interests involved in the utility
proceedings.14
Although independent offices of con-
sumer counsel avoid some of the pitfalls
inherent in ratepayer representation by
regulatory agency staff and the attorney
general's office, they face limitations
nonetheless. By far the largest roadblock
to effective advocacy is limited funding
and staff resources. 15 And as government
agencies, they are not totally immune
from political pressures. In addition,
offices of consumer counsel are subject
to few measures of consumer account-
ability. None are elected officials.
Grassroots Citizens Groups as Inter-
venors. Independent consumer groups,
operated as nonprofit corporations, also
represent residential ratepayers in utility
commission proceedings. Like govern-
ment proxy offices, many were estab-
lished during the 1970s. Some, such as
environmental and low-income groups,
are involved in a wide range of con-
sumer issues in addition to utility pro-
ceedings. Others, like Toward Utility
Rate Normalization (TURN) in northern
California, focus all their attention on
utility matters. Consumer groups often
form coalitions to represent residential
consumers in regulatory proceedings.
Citizens groups are generally not
constrained by the political pressures
that hamper government proxies. In
addition, they are more free to define
their constituency than government
offices, and therefore can take on cases
for discrete interests such as retired per-
sons and low-income consumers.
Their major limitations are financial.
With a typical regulatory proceeding
requiring as much as $100,000 in legal
and expert witness fees, the ability of
consumer groups to mount extensive and
frequent interventions on behalf of resi-
dential ratepayers is limited, particularly
on a long-term basis. Utility proceed-
ings, especially controversial ones, come
and go, and with them go the mem-
bership-based coffers of consumer
groups. (Major rate re-examinations of
monopoly utilities usually occur every
three to five years.) Grassroots groups
generally obtain funding from members
whose support increases when issues are
"hot," and decreases when controversies
fade from public view or are difficult to
understand. As such, consumer groups
are often reactive rather than proactive.
Many are short-lived and are forced to
close their doors when members' interest
declines and contributions no longer
meet expenses.
A handful of states have recognized
the value of supporting grassroots partic-
ipation in regulatory proceedings by
establishing "intervenor compensation"
programs.'6 Citizens groups that repre-
sent residential ratepayers in regulatory
agency proceedings may be awarded
fees based on the nature, extent and
impact of their involvement. Intervenor
compensation programs are usually
funded by assessments on utilities which
are passed on to ratepayers. Although
the programs operate differently in each
state, their goal is to increase consumer
representation and encourage a broader
diversity of interests brought before reg-
ulatory proceedings.
In California, for example, TURN
obtains a substantial percentage of its
budget from the Public Utilities Com-
mission's intervenor compensation pro-
gram. The Wisconsin Citizens' Utility
Board and the Utility Consumers'
Action Network in California have also
obtained intervenor compensation fund-
ing. If these organizations were to rely
solely on membership dues, they would
not be likely to raise sufficient income to
foster the necessary staff expertise to
participate in any meaningful capacity
over the long term.17
The Birth of the CUB Concept
The development of viable and inde-
pendent consumer organizations-free
from both the political constraints which
encumber government proxy advocates
and the funding dilemmas faced by
grassroots citizens groups-has long
been the goal of consumer activists. Dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, members of the
burgeoning consumer movement pushed
for legislation to create a Consumer Pro-
tection Agency at the federal govern-
ment level. The failure of this bill in
1975 (it was vetoed by President Gerald
Ford) was a significant loss for the con-
sumer movement.
Consumer activists subsequently con-
sidered other means to establish organi-
zations that could both advocate on
behalf of consumers and provide a forum
for citizen participation. They recog-
nized the need to create funding mecha-
nisms and governance structures that
would promote the development of
financially healthy, long-tenured organi-
zations. They also wanted to foster the
development of organizations that would
be independent of both government and
private interests and responsible to
the needs and interests of their con-
stituents-and only their constituents.
Bill Insert Mechanism. In the early
1970s, Ralph Nader's Center for Study
of Responsive Law proposed "bill
inserts" as a means to secure funding for
a variety of consumer organizations."8
To enable customers of legal monopolies
and all companies using pre-printed con-
tracts (such as insurance policies and
landlord leases) to join forces and hire
expertise to advocate on their behalf,
Nader proposed that messages soliciting
contributions to and membership in such
consumer organizations be included in
the regular billing envelopes mailed by
these companies to their customers.
Fundraising for consumer groups
would thus be "piggybacked" onto exist-
ing financial transactions-the state-
ments and bills that customers regularly
receive for services such as insurance,
energy utilities, local telephone compa-
nies and financial institutions. In addi-
tion to the company's bill, the customer
would receive an invitation to contribute
toward a consumer group that would
represent the customer in proceedings
before the regulatory commission, the
legislature and the judicial system. The
purpose of the consumer group would be
to control rate increases and promote
policies that benefit the customer of that
particular industry.
Nader proposed that the "carrier
function" be authorized by state or feder-
al law. The law would charter the non-
governmental consumer group and
empower it to represent consumers
before the appropriate regulatory agen-
cies, the legislature and the courts.19
Nader and his colleagues saw bill
inserts as an efficient and effective
means to raise money as well as encour-
age broad consumer participation. The
consumer would read about the advoca-
cy group at the time when he or she is
most responsive to its message-when
paying the bill. Communications would
be highly efficient because organization
messages would reach all customers of
that industry. The organization spawned
through customer responses to the bill
insert would not be taxpayer-funded or
government-sponsored, thereby adding
no extra layers of bureaucracy onto gov-
ernment agencies.
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The "bill insert" concept is a varia-
tion of the "check-off' mechanism to
organize consumers, and is not new.2 0
The check-off essentially makes use of
transactions already engaged in by an
industry to communicate with con-
sumers or employees of that industry. As
originally proposed by Nader, a check-
off card would be included in the com-
pany's billing envelope, allowing the
customer to indicate an amount he or she
was adding to the payment for the pur-
pose of supporting an independent con-
sumer group. The company would com-
pile all contributions and pass them on to
the consumer group each month.
The check-off was first employed by
Nader and his colleagues in 1971 as a
means to fund and organize student
groups to conduct full-time advocacy on
behalf of students and other consumers.
At colleges where the check-off mecha-
nism has been approved by a majority of
the students, fees are included on each
semester's college bills to support Public
Interest Research Groups (PIRGs).21
Students who do not want to contribute
to the PIRG may receive.a refund.
The First CUB. During the late
1970s organizers from one of Nader's
organizations, the Corporate Account-
ability Research Group, criss-crossed the
country in an effort to stimulate the
development of consumer organizations
for utility customers based on the bill
insert concept. With the help of PIRG
activists and a broad coalition of sup-
porters, Wisconsin was the first state to
pass legislation authorizing the use of
utility bill inserts to create a citizens'
utility board, or CUB. In 1979 the Wis-
consin legislature passed a bill requiring
Wisconsin utilities to carry statements
from CUB up to four times per year
inviting utility customers to join the
organization for a minimum fee.22
The bill insert mechanism was as
effective as its proponents had envi-
sioned. In less than a year, over 50,000
utility customers joined CUB. A profes-
sional staff was soon in place, represent-
ing consumers in utility proceedings and
the state legislature. Before long, CUB's
impact was evident. In its first three
years of operation, it was instrumental in
significantly limiting the residential rate
increases requested by both energy and
telephone utilities. In 1984 CUB could
claim that it had saved Wisconsin
ratepayers $100 for every $1 invested in
membership fees in the past 18
months.23
CUB Characteristics. The structure
of CUBs was proposed in publications
which appeared in the late 1970s.24
Robert Leflar and Martin Rogol drafted
a model act for a Residential Utility
Consumer Action Group (RUCAG)
which, with modifications, formed the
basis of the 1979 Wisconsin CUB act.
Three more CUBs were formed in the
ensuing years-in California, Illinois
and Oregon. CUB legislation was under
consideration in at least nine other states
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
25
. Although CUBs vary from state to
state, they all share similar characteris-
tics:
- Prior to 1986, CUBs were autho-
rized to insert messages in the billing
envelopes of utilities a specific number
of times each year, usually four. The text
was prepared by the CUB and approved
by the public utilities commission and
the affected utility before being included
in the mailing.26 If the CUB insert could
be enclosed in the utility bill without
exceeding the one-ounce weight limit,
no postage fee was incurred by the CUB.
Bill inserts described the mission of the
CUB, explained the types of activities it
undertook on behalf of consumers and
solicited membership contributions.
- Contributions to CUBs are volun-
tary. They are held to a minimum to
ensure a broad base of support, including
low-income households and persons on
fixed incomes. Wisconsin's minimum
contribution, for example, was initially
$3. A maximum contribution is usually
specified in order to avoid undue influ-
ence by any one individual.
. CUBs are not government agencies
and are therefore not supported with tax-
payer dollars. Rather, they are privately-
funded nonprofit corporations whose
membership is voluntary.
- Through grassroots organizing,
CUBs foster consumer involvement in
regulatory and legislative proceedings.
They thereby empower utility ratepayers
through increased knowledge of and par-
ticipation in utility issues.
- CUBs are democratically governed
by the members who elect a board of
directors. Once the newly-authorized
CUB has reached a critical mass of
members, it holds an election for board
of directors. In order to qualify for the
ballot, candidates must obtain a speci-
fied number of members' signatures on a
nominating petition. Board members are
elected from regions for set terms, usual-
ly two to four years. For statewide
CUBs, the regions are generally the
state's congressional districts or multi-
ples thereof.
- CUB legislation and/or bylaws
impose strict conflict of interest regula-
tions and campaign contribution restric-
tions on board members in order to
guard against undue influence from spe-
cial interests.
- In order to ensure accountability to
its members, CUB statutes and/or
bylaws usually prescribe stringent
requirements not imposed on traditional
citizens organizations concerning public
records, open meetings, annual reports
and supervised elections.
- CUB organizations are authorized
to represent consumers before the state's
regulatory commission as well as the
legislative and judicial branches of gov-
ernment.
CUB Advantages. The main benefits
of the CUB model are: (1) fundraising
efficiency, (2) organizational indepen-
dence, (3) a mechanism for consumer
participation and empowerment, and (4)
a governance structure that is account-
able to the members.
(1) Fundraising Efficiency. At the
heart of the CUB concept is the use
of the extra space in utility billing
envelopes for the benefit of the cus-
tomers of that utility. Utilities have tradi-
tionally used the extra space to send their
own newsletters and even political mes-
sages to ratepayers. Consumer advocates
have argued that ratepayer access to that
space, at least a few months out of the
year, would bring more balance to utili-
ty-ratepayer communications.
Because utility rates are traditionally
determined by the "cost of doing busi-
ness," and part of "doing business" is
billing customers, the cost of mailing the
monthly bills to customers is paid by the
ratepayers themselves. Therefore, con-
sumer advocates argue that ratepayers
have a property interest in the extra
space in those billing envelopes-
the space not used by the bill itself, up
to the one-ounce limit for first-class
postage-because they are in fact bear-
ing the full cost of mailing the monthly
bills whether that space is left empty or
is filled with additional material.27
Advocates further argue that the extra
space is of value to ratepayers as a
means of communicating and organizing
for their own benefit.
Utility bill inserts, therefore, provide
a highly effective and efficient means of
communicating with all utility customers
and soliciting funding support from
them. CUB messages arrive in envelopes
that will be opened, unlike direct mail
solicitations which tend to be treated as
"junk" and often reach the wastebasket
unopened. In addition, CUB mes-
sages are read at a time when the utility
customer is sensitized to utility
issues-when it's time to pay the bill.
Not only are utility customers more like-
ly to pay attention to the information in
the insert-which may, for example,
alert the reader to a proposed rate
increase-but hey are also more likely
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to consider joining the consumer group
and contributing a membership fee to
support the work of the CUB.
The money savings for CUBs by
"piggybacking" onto utility billing
envelopes are considerable. The cost per
"hit" of traditional direct mail is approx-
imately 25 to 40 cents per envelope
mailed. When CUB messages are insert-
ed in utility bill envelopes, the cost to
the CUB is only one to two cents per
insert. Thus the overall cost to the CUB
of communicating with members and
potential members is as little as one-
twentieth the cost of using direct mail,
the major savings being postage and
labor.
By taking advantage of utility billing
envelopes to communicate with ratepay-
ers, CUBs can direct the money they
would have spent on fundraising to their
first order of business, consumer advo-
cacy. Low fundraising costs enable
CUBs to maintain minimal dues require-
ments, from $3 to $10, thereby attracting
members from low- and fixed-income
households. In contrast, citizens groups
which must raise funds solely through
direct mail campaigns and door-to-door
canvassing must set much higher mem-
bership fees, at least $25 per year, in
order to pay the substantial overhead
expenses of these methods.
The additional cost to the utility of
enclosing the CUB's flyer is virtually
nil, as long as the insert does not cause
the envelope to weigh more than one
ounce. Most utilities, especially those
with a large customer base, have enough
"envelope stuffing" equipment to handle
as many as three extra inserts in addition
to the bill.
Overall, the fundraising efficiency of
utility bill enclosures can be the key to a
CUB's financial success and, hence, its
ability to work for consumers' interests
over the long run. In contrast, the bud-
gets of consumer groups funded by
direct mail solicitations and canvassing
are often insufficient to intervene consis-
tently. Likewise, government advocates
are generally limited by fiscal and politi-
cal constraints. The financial self-suffi-
ciency of CUBs, engendered by the use
of bill inserts to solicit membership con-
tributions, provides the foundation for
their long-term stability and organiza-
tional independence. CUBs have the
added advantage of not imposing addi-
tional costs on taxpayers, nor on those
who do not wish to participate in the
CUB.
(2) Organizational Independence.
CUBs are independent, nongovernment,
nonprofit organizations funded with
membership contributions. They are not
supported with taxpayer dollars and, as
such, are not subject to the political pres-
sures and budgetary vagaries of govern-
ment agencies. Nor do they add a layer
of bureaucracy to any government
departments.
CUBs, therefore, are able to directly
and solely advocate for consumer inter-
ests. They have one client. They need
not be concerned, as must government
agencies, that the budget will be axed
due to interparty conflicts, the pressures
of special interests or budgetary short-
falls. Nor must they temper either their
message or the nature of their actions to
suit the individuals and political party in
power.
(3) Consumer Empowerment and
Participation. Acting alone, very few
individuals have the financial means and
expertise to participate in any depth in
utility proceedings. By the same token,
consumer groups cannot match the utili-
ties which have full-time staffs of spe-
cialists dedicated to presenting their cas-
es before the regulatory commission.
But by pooling their money through
CUBs, consumers can hire experts to
speak for them in commission hearings,
legislative committee meetings and court
proceedings.
According to Nader, CUBs therefore
represent a means to empower con-
sumers in order to "redress the imbal-
ance of power between utilities and
consumers."28 Even if they have only
minimal impact on rates, CUBs
give consumers a "privately-controlled
voice," and one that has legal standing to
represent ratepayers before utility pro-
ceedings in all three branches of govern-
ment.
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Integral to empowerment is participa-
tion. CUBs have the potential "to
involve citizens in the regulation of one
of society's most important economic
institutions, the utilities."30 The payment
of monthly utility bills can seem as
uncontrollable and inevitable as "death
and taxes," and at least as confounding.
CUBs hold the potential to alleviate the
confusion and frustration by educating
consumers about the intricacies of utility
regulation. At the same time, CUBs can
give consumers a platform on which to
participate in the ratemaking process. As
a case in point, members of the four
existing CUBs are noted for their partici-
pation in hearings and their active letter-
writing campaigns to public utilities
commissioners and legislators.
(4) Accountable Governance Struc-
ture. CUBs are governed by a board of
directors elected by the members of dis-
crete districts, usually the congressional
districts of the state. In order to qualify
for the ballot, candidates must gather a
minimum number of CUB members'
signatures on a nomination petition (typ-
ically, 30 signatures). This ensures that
the candidate has some organizing capa-
bilities as well as the support of existing
CUB members within the candidate's
district-in other words, evidence of
community ties.
A democratic organizational structure
is one of the hallmarks of the CUB con-
cept. It serves to keep the CUB account-
able and responsive to its members. In
addition, the democratic foundation of
CUBs separates it from other types of
organizations that provide consumer
advocacy on utility issues. Government
agencies that represent consumers in
utility proceedings tend to be account-
able to the appointing person or political
party, not necessarily to residential con-
sumers.
Similarly, consumer groups that are
membership-based, but not democrati-
cally structured, generally do not have
strong accountability mechanisms that
link membership interests to organiza-
tion actions. While their very existence
depends on addressing consumer issues
effectively, their communication is often
one-way-from the organization to the
membership. CUBs, on the other hand,
with their emphasis on democratic elec-
tions of representatives, have a built-in
link to the membership.
Utility Challenges to Bill Inserts
Early CUB developments were
promising. The Wisconsin CUB got off
to a strong start from its inception in
1979. By 1984, CUBs had been formed
in three other states-California, Illinois
and Oregon-with CUB legislation
pending in several other states. The utili-
ties responded to this growing consumer
movement by challenging CUBs' abili-
ty to use the extra space in billing
envelopes on first amendment grounds.
California Bill Insert Experiments.
The roots of the legal challenge to bill
insert privileges date back to 1980. As
an intervenor in a ratemaking proceed-
ing, a consumer group in northern Cali-
fornia, Toward Utility Rate Normaliza-
tion (TURN), challenged the practice of
the state's largest utility, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company (PG&E), of inserting
its newsletter in billing envelopes at
ratepayers' expense. In particular,
TURN objected to PG&E's espousal of
political positions in its newsletters. As a
result of TURN's complaint, the Califor-
nia Public Utilities Commission (PUC),
in a December 1981 decision, invited
consumer groups to bring a test case
before it to explore potential uses of the
extra space.
31
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The following year, the Center for
Public Interest Law (CPIL), an organiza-
tion affiliated with the University of San
Diego School of Law, filed a complaint
with the PUC requesting use of the extra
space in the billing envelopes of the
local energy utility, San Diego Gas and
Electric Company (SDG&E). At that
time, SDG&E rates were ranked second
highest in the nation. CPIL asked the
PUC to require SDG&E to allow a new
local consumer group structured as a cit-
izens' utility board to insert membership
appeals in its billing envelopes and, once
fully operational, to intervene on behalf
of SDG&E ratepayers before the PUC
and in legislative and court proceedings.
The PUC held hearings on the com-
plaint and approved the request to use
bill inserts in April 1983,32 concluding
that "the space had great value to
ratepayers, that the [PUC] had a strong
regulatory interest in determining how
that space should be used, and that
ratepayers had the equivalent of a prop-
erty interest in that space."33 When the
extra space is used for a utility's own
advertising instead of other purposes,
such as selling the space to advertisers or
including energy conservation informa-
tion, the ratepayers "forego savings from
advertising revenue or savings generated
by conservation information.... [At the
same time, the utilities] may capture the
value of such savings, thereby recover-
ing an 'opportunity cost' from the
ratepayers."
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The CUB that was subsequently cre-
ated, the Utility Consumers' Action Net-
work (UCAN), was the first in the state
to be granted permission to use billing
envelopes for membership and fundrais-
ing solicitations. The PUC initially lim-
ited UCAN's bill insert privileges to a
two-year experimental period, after
which the practice would be evaluated.
Six months and two bill inserts later,
UCAN had attracted a phenomenal
50,000 members, making it the second
largest consumer group in the state.
After only two years in existence, mem-
bership grew to 70,000.
In May 1983 TURN followed suit
and filed a petition with the PUC seek-
ing access to PG&E billing envelopes.
TURN sought to insert a check-off form
listing the names and descriptions of
several consumer groups, including
TURN. Utility customers would have
the opportunity to contribute to one of
those organizations along with their util-
ity bill payment. The PUC granted
access to TURN, but did not authorize
the use of a check-off form. Because no
other groups had sought access to the
PG&E envelopes, the PUC granted
access to TURN alone four times per
year for a period of two years. Because
TURN was not structured democratical-
ly as a CUB (in contrast to the democrat-
ically-established UCAN in San Diego),
the PUC required that TURN establish
adequate accounting mechanisms for
ratepayer contributions and that it report
annually to its contributors.
35
Unlike SDG&E, PG&E challenged
TURN's access to its utility billing
envelopes by filing a petition for review
before the California Supreme Court.
When that court refused to hear the case,
PG&E brought the case before the U.S.
Supreme Court in October 1984. That
case, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub-
lic Utilities Commission of California, et
al., has come to be known as PG&E v.
PUC.36
During the same period of time, bill
insert cases that would eventually have
an impact on PG&E v. PUC were under
consideration in New York. In the late
1970s the New York Public Service
Commission (PSC) attempted to prohibit
utilities from including political adver-
tising in their monthly bills-specifical-
ly, advertising by Consolidated Edison
Company in support of nuclear power
and newsletter messages by Central
Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation
promoting the use of electricity. Both
companies' legal challenges were decid-
ed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980.
In both Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York v. Public Service Commission of
New York37 and Central Hudson Gas
and Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,38 the Court
found that the utilities' free speech rights
had been violated because the PSC had
attempted to restrict the content or sub-
ject matter of the utility companies' mes-
sages.
When the California Public Utilities
Commission weighed these Supreme
Court rulings in its 1983 UCAN and
TURN decisions, it decided that the two
New York cases were not applicable.39
The PUC determined that its order
would not limit the content of the utili-
ty's speech and therefore was not a vio-
lation of the utility's right of free speech.
The PUC reasoned that it had made no
attempt to regulate how the utility used
the extra space during those months
when UCAN did not have access to the
billing envelopes.40
PG&E v. PUC. However, five jus-
tices of the U.S. Supreme Court dis-
agreed with the California Public Utili-
ties Commission. In a 5-3 plurality
decision, the Court ruled that the PUC's
"compelled access" order requiring
PG&E to carry TURN's inserts infringed
on PG&E's "negative free speech"
rights, or its right "not to speak."41 The
decision, written by Justice Lewis Pow-
ell, held that a consumer group's use of
utility billings envelopes for its own
enclosures impermissibly forces the util-
ity to associate with messages which
might compel it to respond when it may
prefer to remain silent, or to limit its own
speech in order to avoid controversy.
42
The opinion cited Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo43 and Wooley v.
Maynard4 as supporting both the utili-
ty's right not to speak and its right not to
be compelled by the state to publish
something against its wishes.
Further, the Court found that the
access afforded to such consumer groups
through bill inserts was not content-neu-
tral, but rather content-based.a5 In other
words, the PUC's order restricted access
to billing envelopes to those expressing
certain viewpoints-specifically, those
who opposed the utility in regulatory
proceedings. As such, the order could
not be classified as a permissible "time,
place or manner" regulation.
46
Finally, the Court ruled that the com-
pelled access order was not a "narrowly
tailored means of serving a compelling
state interest."47 While the state's interest
in fair and effective utility regulation
may be compelling, "the State can serve
that interest through means that would
not violate [PG&E's] First Amendment
rights, such as awarding costs and
fees."48 As to the state's asserted interest
in "promoting speech by making a vari-
ety of views available to [PG&E's] cus-
tomers," the Court reiterated that "this
interest is not furthered by an order that
is not content neutral."49
The ruling did indicate, however, that
content-neutral informational inserts
would not violate a utility's first amend-
ment rights. Legal notices or other types
of informational disclosures ponsored
by the PUC would be acceptable as bill
inserts.5O
The plurality opinion came as a shock
to the consumer groups which filed
amicus curiae briefs in support of the
PUC's order. These groups were particu-
larly concerned that the opinion ignored
the fact that PG&E is not a mere corpo-
ration; it is a regulated monopoly and, as
such, is often required to carry messages
with which it probably disagrees, such as
announcements of upcoming hearings
and notices that ratepayers are due
refunds. Amici found it particularly iron-
ic that first amendment standards were
used in the case to limit diversity of
expressed views, by blocking access to
the citizenry of views otherwise not
available and on behalf of those paying
involuntarily for the medium.
5
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CUB PROFILES
The 1986 PG&E v. PUC Supreme
Court decision not only curtailed CUBs'
use of the extra space in utility bills for
membership solicitations. It effectively
halted the formation of new CUBs
throughout the nation. At the time of the
ruling, CUBs were on the drawing
boards in a number of states, with con-
sumer coalitions already organized and
legislation drafted.5
2
However, in spite of the loss of one of
their most potent weapons, the CUBs
formed prior to the 1986 decision all
have survived and continue to success-
fully represent utility customers in regu-
latory proceedings, legislative action a d
court challenges. The xisting CUBs in
Wisconsin, Illinois, California and Ore-
gon share a number of similarities. Each
solicits members from residential house-
holds, keeping dues to a minimum to
ensure a broad base of support. Each is
funded primarily from membership con-
tributions. And perhaps most significant-
ly, each exists as an independent organi-
zation, separate from government and
corporate affiliation. Table 1 summarizes
the key characteristics and major contri-
butions of the existing CUBs.
Each CUB has also evolved into a
unique organization with major differ-
ences from the other CUBs.
- Oregon's CUB, the most recently
created, is the only one which did not
build its membership through bill
inserts. It is also unique in that it is the
only CUB to be established by citizens
initiative.
- The Utility Consumers' Action Net-
work (UCAN) in San Diego, California,
is the only CUB to be created through an
order of a regulatory commission, the
California Public Utilities Commission.
It is also the only CUB which serves a
local constituency. The rest are statewide
in scope.
- Both Wisconsin and Illinois CUBs
were created by state statute and took
advantage of utility bill insert privileges
for several years. Wisconsin's has since
disbanded as a quasi-state agency and
has reorganized as a private nonprofit
corporation.
- In Illinois, on the other hand, the
CUB statute has been amended to allow
CUB messages to be included in the
mailings of state government agencies. It
is the first CUB to take advantage of
state agency mailings to communicate
with utility consumers. Its innovative
answer to the loss of utility bill insert
Table 1
Summary: Characteristics of Existing CUBs
CUBs Origin Scope Current Memb. / Funding Approx. Annual Estimated SavingsHighest Memb. Source Budget to Ratepayers*
Statewide for $100 saved for every $1
Wisconsin 1979 by residential, Memberships spent on dues, 1983-1984,




UCAN 1983 by specific for Memberships $265 million estimatedresidential & 24,000/ and
(San Diego, regulatory small 70,000 intervenor $150,000 ratepayers savings,
CA) agency business compensation 1985-1988
ratepayers
Statewide for $100 to $150 savings
1983 by residential 170,000/ Mper ratepayer per year,Illinois state law residential , / emberships $1.7 million 1984-1990,
Illiois state law ratepayers 170,000toaigve
totaling over
$2 billion
1984 by Statewide for $318 saved per ratepayer
Oregon citizens residential 10,000/
initiative ratepayers 20,000 Memberships $150,000 dues, 1984-1989,totaling $124 million
*The figures presented in this chart and in the report are conservative estimates of the amounts saved by
ratepayers through CUB intervention. As noted below in this section, it is impossible to quantify the successful
efforts of CUBs in areas such as holding company regulation and consumer education. Nor is it possible to
present uniform comparable statistics on savings attributed to CUBs because such statistics have not been
documented in a uniform manner over the past ten years.
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privileges promises to become the model
for newly developing CUBs.
This section provides an overview of
the four existing CUBs, noting the cata-
lysts that brought them into being, their
growth as consumer organizations and
their major achievements on behalf of
consumers. It also discusses the recent
creation of the nation's fifth CUB in
New York.
Wisconsin: The Nation's First
CUB
Origin. After three years of grass-
roots organizing and legislative defeats,
the Wisconsin state legislature passed
the Citizens' Utility Board Act in
1979.53 Rising utility bills had forged
formidable public support for any legis-
lation that would give more control to
residential ratepayers. Nonetheless, the
CUB coalition of consumer groups,
senior citizens and labor organizations
faced strong opposition from utility lob-
bying. The utilities grudgingly withdrew
opposition to the CUB bill when public
support for an elected Public Service
Commission (PSC) grew. The CUB con-
cept became the "lesser of two evils," a
politically acceptable alternative to
elected commissioners.
The enabling statute prescribes the
mission of the citizens' utility board as
twofold. It is a statewide organization
which represents individual farm and
residential utility consumers before reg-
ulatory agencies, the legislature and oth-
er government bodies. And CUB is
charged with providing consumer educa-
tion on utility service costs as well as
methods of energy conservation.
The Wisconsin CUB would be the
first consumer group in the nation to
insert its own messages in utility bills.
The experiment in utility consumer rep-
resentation had begun. Ralph Nader's
dream of establishing communication
with consumers through monthly utility
bills was about to be tested.
Membership Development and
Fundraising Strategies. The enabling
statute required that formal organiza-
tional status could only be granted when
CUB obtained a minimum number of
members (1,000) with at least 50 mem-
bers in each congressional district.
Although CUB had five years to obtain
the requisite number of members, it
crossed this threshold within a few
months. In March 1980, CUB convened
an interim board of directors, appointed
by the governor. In December 1980 it
held its first election to fill two board
positions for each of Wisconsin's nine
congressional districts.5 4
CUB wasted no time in taking advan-
tage of utility bill inserts to invite farm
and residential ratepayers to join the new
organization. In July 1980, it included a
test enclosure in the monthly bill of Wis-
consin Power and Light Company.
Although the utility objected to the mes-
sage, the PSC approved it. The enclosure
was designed as a self-mailer. It
described the mission of the new con-
sumer organization and solicited mem-
bers to contribute an annual dues of $3
(or more if they chose), the minimum
prescribed by the CUB law.
Soon thereafter CUB directed.its first
full statewide mailing to telephone cus-
tomers of Wisconsin Bell. The enclo-
sure's headline asked, "Are you mad as
#!!* about your phone bills? Now, for
less than 1¢ per day, you can do some-
thing about it! Join the Citizens' Utility
Board." It explained the mission of
CUBs and invited phone customers to
join the new consumer organization.
By October 1980 enclosures had
drawn 5,000 members to CUB. Member-
ship grew to 15,000 by November of
CUB's first year of operation. By 1981
CUB had become a full-fledged organi-
zation with the hiring of an executive
director, staff attorney and support staff.
A canvassing operation was initiated in
1982 to increase membership and sup-
plement the funds raised through utility
bill enclosures.
CUB's first executive director
resigned in 1982, and the organization
was without a director for nearly a year.
Kathleen O'Reilly, former head of the
Consumer Federation, a nationwide con-
sumer organization, became the new
executive director in April 1983. In the
next few years, CUB grew to 100,000
members, with an annual budget as high
as $700,000 and an ambitious caseload.
The organization's growth was fos-
tered by strengthening the canvass,
increasing CUB's media visibility
throughout the state, and winning major
victories for Wisconsin ratepayers.
Three full-time canvassers and an army
of college students spread CUB's can-
vassing operation statewide, attracting
thousands of new members to the orga-
nization. CUB developed a statewide
media strategy by actively pursuing
media channels to disseminate CUB's
message throughout the state. Key con-
sumer victories "really put CUB on the
map," according to O'Reilly-including
the 1983 defeat of Wisconsin Bell's
request for mandatory local measured
service and the demise of legislation that
would have allowed the energy utilities
to diversify through the formation of
unregulated holding companies.55
Organizational strength did not nec-
essarily translate into financial security,
however. With the loss of billing insert
privileges in 1986, the Wisconsin CUB
had to rely on direct mail appeals and
door-to-door canvassing to maintain an
adequate membership base. Canvassing,
although effective when first implement-
ed, had become an unpredictable and
overhead-intensive means to solicit
members and was curtailed in 1988.
In the meantime, the Wisconsin legis-
lature made an intervenor compensation
fund available to organizations that rep-
resent consumers before the PSC.56 The
fund, available since 1983, has allowed
CUB to enhance its consumer advocacy
by hiring rate analysts and expert wit-
nesses. Intervenor compensation has not
always been a reliable source of funding,
however. According to O'Reilly, CUB
experienced difficulty in obtaining
approval of some of its requests by the
PSC. Nonetheless, the fund has provided
a continued source of support for outside
witnesses and legal expertise.
Consumer Advocacy. The Wisconsin
CUB hit the ground running in its first
year of consumer advocacy. In 1981 it
spoke out against the automatic fuel
adjustment clause which allowed the
energy utilities to raise rates without
submitting to formal PSC proceedings; it
opposed utilities' efforts to diversify into
unregulated businesses; and it alerted
telephone customers to the coming
debate over local measured service,
which would treat local calls like long
distance service, charging for length of
time, distance and time of day. CUB's
achievements in the ensuing years
include the following:
- In 1983 CUB was instrumental in
saving consumers $40 million in a Wis-
consin Power and Light (WPL) rate
case, CUB's first major victory. In
another electrical utility case that year,
Northern States Power was granted just
10% of the rate increase it had requested
from the PSC.
- In another 1983 victory for CUB,
the legislature passed a law that excludes
from utility rates most money spent on
advertising. Only in limited circum-
stances is utility advertising funded by
ratepayers, for example, information
about safety and energy conservation.
57
- In 1983 CUB also championed the
elimination of the automatic fuel adjust-
ment clause which had been in place
since the oil embargo days of the early
1970s. Electric utility companies had
been authorized to pass their fuel cost
increases on to their customers on a
monthly basis without going through
ratemaking proceedings, resulting in
steadily rising rates. CUB contended that
this practice not only bypassed the regu-
latory process but also provided no
incentives for the utilities to seek




the cheapest suppliers. The new energy
procurement process eventually resulted
in a ratepayer refund of $9 million in
1989 for overpayments by WPL to a
Montana coal company.
- In a 1983 victory for low-income
consumers, CUB convinced the PSC to
consider ratepayers' ability to pay in all
future rate cases, the first such require-
ment in the country, according to
O'Reilly.
- A 1985 Wisconsin Electric Power
Company request was reduced from $50
million to $34 million.
- Beginning in 1985, at a time when
utilities cited the "insurance crisis" as a
basis for increasing certain rates, CUB
challenged the utilities' insurance pro-
curement and payment practices, the
first such intervenor in the nation to do
so, according to O'Reilly. The PSC sub-
sequently developed standards for disal-
lowing certain premiums-those, for
example, which provide coverage to the
utility's unregulated subsidiaries or affil-
iates.
- In several rate cases in the mid-
1980s, CUB fought successfully against
utility and commission staff recommen-
dations to raise the fixed monthly
charges of the energy utilities.
CUB has also taken an active role in
telephone issues, not only in rate cases
but also in regulatory proceedings
regarding rate structure:
- In a 1983 Wisconsin Telephone pro-
ceeding, the phone company requested a
rate increase of $162 million. CUB's
intervention resulted in a final PSC deci-
sion of $89 million, a $23 million
decrease from PSC's own recommenda-
tion of $112 million and a 45% decrease
from the original request.
- In 1985 CUB was instrumental in
obtaining a refund of $14.65 per tele-
phone customer. PSC ordered a total
refund of $24 million for windfall profits
when Wisconsin Bell overestimated the
effect on rates of the divestiture of
AT&T.
- In 1988 CUB charged Wisconsin
Bell with fraudulent and abusive tele-
marketing practices, resulting in a $1.2
million fine, the largest fine ever
imposed by a Wisconsin attorney gener-
al on a corporation.
* Until 1990 CUB succeeded in
thwarting Wisconsin Bell's attempt to
institute a cost-per-call method of
assessing phone bills (local measured
service). However, the PSC passed a
mandatory local measured service plan
in September 1990 that would put all
residential phone usage on a pay-per-call
basis, starting at six cents per call. At
this writing, CUB and a broad coalition
of citizens groups are supporting legisla-
tion that will preserve the flat rate option
for residential customers and prohibit
mandatory charges for duration, distance
and time-of-day on local calls.
Savings to Ratepayers. By 1984
CUB could assert that it had saved Wis-
consin ratepayers $100 for every $1
invested in membership fees in the pre-
vious eighteen months. That mount rep-
resented rate reductions of $81 million
for proceedings in which CUB played a
major role, and an additional $161 mil-
lion where CUB cooperated with the
PSC.58
In subsequent years, despite cutbacks
in staffing and budget due to curtailment
of the use of bill enclosures, CUB con-
tinued to be an effective voice for
ratepayers. In 1989 savings attributed to
proceedings where CUB took the lead in
the prior two years were estimated at $29
for every $1 spent in members' dues.
From 1988 to 1989, CUB action resulted
in shaving $30 million off rate requests
involving the major Wisconsin energy
and telephone utilities.59
Not included in these figures are
CUB efforts on issues to which no price
tag can be attached. As an example,
O'Reilly cites CUB's contribution in
leading the effort to strengthen Wiscon-
sin's winter disconnection policies.
CUB's role in sharpening the regulations
that govern utilities are also difficult to
quantify, such as its successful efforts to
prohibit utilities from including advertis-
ing costs in their rates unless they can
show direct benefit to customers.60
CUB's consumer education activities
are also difficult to assess in dollars-and-
cents benefits to ratepayers. Since its
beginning, CUB has promoted energy
conservation by informing its members
of ways to reduce their utility bills by
cutting back on energy use. It has publi-
cized conservation practices through its
newsletter, energy fairs, and the distribu-
tion of educational materials at public
events.
Enclosure Gains and Losses, From
1980 through 1984, CUB inserted its
enclosures in over 90 mailings of Wis-
consin energy and telephone utilities.
The advantages of using billing inserts
were immediately evident o the Wis-
consin CUB. Membership grew by leaps
and bounds, enabling the organization to
be fully staffed and actively operating
within a year of creation. Because of the
bill insert mechanism, CUB was able to
keep the costs of communicating with
ratepayers low, thereby directing its
financial resources to advocating for
ratepayers' interests.
The price of the enclosure privilege
was ultimately high, however. When
CUB's consumer advocacy grew
stronger and its victories increased, utili-
ties began to employ a variety of meth-
ods to dilute CUB's messages. During
1984, utilities inserted "counter-mes-
sages" in billing envelopes which con-
tained CUB enclosures, rebutting points
raised in CUB messages. While the
statute required CUB to submit its pro-
posed enclosure text to the PSC in
advance for approval,6 1 no such legal
requirement was imposed on the utilities
with respect to their counter-messages.
According to Kathleen O'Reilly, utilities
also tampered with the placement of
enclosures. In 1984, the last year in
which CUB enclosed messages in utility
mailings, six Wisconsin utilities placed
the inserts backwards and upside down,
thereby rendering the enclosures less
visible in the envelope.
The overall impact was a marked
decrease in enclosure effectiveness. The
loss of the billing insert privilege
brought about by the 1986 Supreme
Court decision was "almost a moot point
at that time," according to board of
directors president Tom Lonsway. "CUB
was breaking even at best."62 At the time
of the Supreme Court decision, the orga-
nization had ceased using enclosures
altogether. Instead, it focused on can-
vassing, direct mail and media exposure
to solicit new members and maintain its
existing membership base.
In 1986 CUB abandoned its quasi-
state agency status and became a private
nonprofit organization. Several factors
led CUB to sever its ties with the statute
that had guided it since 1979. The board
believed that the responsibilities of state
agency status now outweighed any
advantages once conferred by the
statute.63 Bill inserts, a key provision of
the law, had been nullified by PG&E v.
PUC; furthermore, inserts had become
an ineffective way to solicit new mem-
bers and were no longer being used by
CUB. Some provisions of the law were
burdensome and expensive to follow,
such as the requirement that CUB board
meeting minutes be placed in every
library in the state. Further, the statute
limited CUB to representing only resi-
dential and farm consumers. CUB want-
ed to broaden its membership base to
include small businesses and utility
cooperatives. Finally, as a private orga-
nization CUB would no longer have to
live under the threat that the legislature
would abolish it by repealing the CUB
statute. Therefore, the board legally dis-
solved as CUB in April 1986 and reorga-
nized as the Citizens' Utility Board, Inc.,
a private nonprofit and nonstock corpo-
ration.64 The new organization retains its
democratically elected board of direc-
tors.
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Recent Developments. In recent
years, CUB has experienced further
organizational change. After six years as
executive director, Kathleen O'Reilly
resigned in 1989. Her successor was
short-tenured, leaving CUB without a
full-time director for nearly a year.
(Board president Tom Lonsway served
as interim director.)
In 1990 the PSC and the attorney
general's office conducted investigations
of CUB's computation of intervenor
compensation funds during the previous
two years. Although both offices deter-
mined that CUB had calculated the
funds appropriately, the investigation
consumed considerable staff time and
financial resources. During a nine-month
period, CUB was not able to participate
as extensively in utility proceedings as it
had in the past, although it continued to
make headway in several key telephone
issues. Fundraising activities were also
hampered. By the end of 1990, CUB's
budget was seriously depleted.
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CUB has since taken steps to rebuild,
both financially and organizationally. In
January 1991 the board of directors
hired an executive director, a legislative
director, and an office manager to join
the organization's program director. The
new director, Christopher Blythe, is a
past CUB employee and long-time CUB
activist. According to Blythe, CUB is
"revitalizing as a grassroots organiza-
tion" by building coalitions around PSC
and legislative issues and involving the
members in an activist network. Blythe
adds that CUB is also "engaging in
ongoing direct mail and telemarketing
campaigns to strengthen CUB's mem-
bership and fundraising base."66
UCAN: The Only Local CUB
Origin. The California Public Utili-
ties Commission (PUC) opened the door
for consumer groups' access to utility
bill envelopes in December 1981, when
it invited consumer groups to bring a test
case before it to explore potential uses of
the extra space in utility billing
envelopes.67 In 1982 a group of faculty
members and students at the Center for
Public Interest Law (CPIL) at the Uni-
versity of San Diego School of Law filed
a complaint with the PUC requesting
that it require the local energy utility,
San Diego Gas and Electric Company
(SDG&E), to insert CUB membership
appeals in its monthly bills. In a series of
contested hearings, CPIL presented legal
services attorneys, community leaders
and expert testimony to establish that:
(1) PUC proceedings were resource-
imbalanced in favor of SDG&E; (2) the
PUC had no office or staff south of Los
Angeles; (3) there was empty space in
the SDG&E billing envelopes; and (4)
serious and numerous problems afflicted
the operation of SDG&E-from the
competence of its management to its
compliance with existing PUC rules and
tariffs. 68
The PUC approved CPIL's request in
April 1983.69 The resulting CUB, the
Utility Consumers' Action Network
(UCAN), was the first in the nation to be
created by regulatory commission
action, and the first and only in the
nation to organize as a local utility
watchdog (all others are statewide orga-
nizations).70
The PUC declined to be involved in
appointing an interim board of directors
and transferred that authority to the Cen-
ter for Public Interest Law. Robert Fell-
meth, director of CPIL and one of the
founders of the new CUB, appointed an
interim board in 1987. Fellmeth chose,
in his words, a "super blue-ribbon
board" composed of noted community
leaders. The interim board included the
mayor of San Diego, who served as
chair; a labor leader; a state assembly-
member and a state senator, each from
different political parties; a law school
dean; the foreman of the grand jury, a
retired Marine Corps general; and repre-
sentatives from the three major prosecut-
ing entities, the U.S. Attorney, the Dis-
trict Attorney and the City Attorney.
According to Fellmeth, prominent indi-
viduals were selected "to lend credibility
to the organization and to underscore the
importance of CUB's mission."' Fell-
meth served as acting director during
UCAN's first year of operation, until
March 1984.
Membership Development. Six
months after the interim board of direc-
tors was convened and bylaws were
drafted, the first UCAN membership
appeal was mailed with SDG&E bills.
The message reached 850,000 house-
holds in the San Diego area: "Why do
you think this bill is so high* ...Because
SDG&E has many lawyers, rate experts
and accountants to influence the public
utilities commission.. and you do not.
Now you have the chance to even the
odds."
The insert drew a phenomenal 35,000
members to UCAN, a return rate of 4%.
A second membership appeal, mailed in
December 1983, attracted another
15,000 members. In five short months,
UCAN's membership had reached
50,000.
The first election for board of direc-
tors was held January 1984. Community
interest in the election was extraordinari-
ly high. Twenty-six candidates vied for
nine positions on the board, each having
obtained the requisite number of signa-
tures on nominating petitions to qualify
for candidacy (30 signatures from
UCAN members in the candidate's dis-
trict). Over 30% voted for their represen-
tatives to the nine-member board, a vot-
ing rate higher than most statewide
elections. By June, UCAN had hired a
full-time executive director, and soon
thereafter began to participate in regula-
tory proceedings on behalf of San Diego
ratepayers.
UCAN continued to grow with each
subsequent utility bill insert. A total of
eight enclosures were mailed to San
Diego ratepayers in 1984 and 1985,
bringing UCAN's membership to nearly
70,000, 8% of area households. UCAN
had become the second largest consumer
group in the state and the third largest
CUB in the country, an astounding
achievement considering its membership
appeals were limited to a metropolitan
area of 850,000 households.72
Enclosure and Fundraising Set-
backs. In April 1985 UCAN applied to
the PUC for renewal of bill insert privi-
leges. (The PUC's original ruling in
1983 had authorized a two-year trial
run.) The PUC voted in favor of
UCAN's request, but stayed the order
pending the outcome of the PG&E v.
PUC case.73 UCAN's use of SDG&E
billing envelopes for membership solici-
tation was, for all practical purposes,
curtailed. Its last insert was enclosed in
the April 1985 SDG&E billing envelope.
UCAN faced a deficit at the same
time that its tried-and-true means of
attracting new members could no longer
be employed. In October 1985 it hired a
new director, Michael Shames, who, as a
law student at the University of San
Diego, had organized the hearings that
led to the formation of UCAN as a Cen-
ter for Public Interest Law advocacy pro-
ject. He and the board of directors insti-
tuted an austerity budget and within a
year reversed UCAN's deficit.
UCAN employed both direct mail
and canvassing to bolster its membership
ranks. It discontinued the canvassing
operation because of high overhead costs
and limited results. Since 1986, UCAN
has supplemented its budget with PUC
intervenor compensation funds for its
contributions to SDG&E ratesetting cas-
es. This source of funding has not been
extensive or reliable, however.
UCAN now has an active member-
ship of about 24,000 members, and it
continues to communicate with former
and "intermittent" members comprising
a total membership base of 53,000 San
Diegans. The organization operates on a
trim $150,000 annual budget. Currently
UCAN's advocacy and outreach are han-
dled by a three-person staff. Executive
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director Shames oversees UCAN's par-
ticipation in regulatory proceedings, and
two part-time employees coordinate
membership outreach and media rela-
tions.
Consumer Advocacy. Between 1973
and 1983, SDG&E's electric rates had
become among the highest in the nation,
jumping 387% for residential customers
and 536% for commercial and industrial
customers. In 1985, SDG&E requested a
$123 million rate increase, the same year
that UCAN became active in PUC pro-
ceedings. In the ensuing years,
SDG&E's rates have dropped 47%, due
in large part to energy procurement prac-
tices championed by UCAN which have
required SDG&E to import cheaper
power. By 1989, SDG&E's electrical
rates had become the lowest of Califor-
nia's "big three" power utilities.
UCAN's interventions on behalf of San
Diego consumers include the follow-
ing:
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- The PUC ordered a $36 million rate
reduction in a 1985 energy cost adjust-
ment clause (ECAC) proceeding, includ-
ing $6.7 million in savings from a
requirement that SDG&E buy cheaper
power from southwest utilities. Between
1986 and 1988, the change in SDG&E
purchasing policies accounted for an
estimated $91.6 million savings.
- In late 1985, UCAN led an effort to
transfigure a $123 million rate increase
into an unprecedented $137 million rate
decrease. UCAN's arguments for a 1.5%
drop in SDG&E's rate of return, plus
penalties for faulty oil purchase con-
tracts and other computational adjust-
ments, amounted to $45 million of that
decrease.
- In the same 1985 General Rate
Case, the PUC accepted UCAN's evi-
dence of a "sweetheart deal" between
SDG&E and its electricity-generating
subsidiary Applied Energy, Inc. The
resulting disallowance saved SDG&E
customers $20 million.
- In 1986 the PUC effectively reject-
ed SDG&E's application to create a util-
ity holding company by imposing
restrictions on SDG&E's diversification
efforts and ordering ratepayer reim-
bursement for assets used by the unregu-
lated affiliates of the holding company.
SDG&E abandoned the proposal rather
than accept the PUC's conditions, many
of which had been recommended by
UCAN.
. In a 1987 ECAC proceeding,
UCAN's expert testimony and computa-
tions were attributed as a substantial fac-
tor in the PUC's order reducing
SDG&E's rates by $141 million.
- In 1988 UCAN was a major inter-
venor in SDG&E's 1989 General Rate
Case in which the company entered into
a settlement with intervenors to reduce
rates by $134 million. The PUC express-
ly recognized UCAN's proposals for
allocation of this reduction to residential
customers in its decision accepting the
settlement.
- In 1988 the PUC accepted UCAN's
arguments and repealed a controversial
$4.80 monthly charge that had been
approved in late 1987. One thousand
people, most of them UCAN members,
attended a hearing to protest the charge.
- In 1989 the PUC ordered SDG&E
to return $31 million to its customers for
mismanaging power purchases from
southwest utilities. The PUC adopted
UCAN's criticisms of SDG&E's power
contracting policies.
- In 1990 UCAN's testimony con-
tributed to reducing SDG&E's proposed
$99 million rate increase by half.
- In 1991 UCAN succeeded in per-
suading the PUC to trim SDG&E's pro-
posed $67 million rate increase to $4
million. UCAN's effort to capture a $25
million windfall for customers was the
primary factor in the case.
Savings to Ratepayers. In its first
three years of advocacy (1985 to 1988),
the estimated savings to SDG&E
ratepayers resulting from UCAN's work
is estimated at nearly $265 million.
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Director Shames warns that these fig-
ures, although impressive, "don't tell the
whole story."76 He points out that a great
deal of UCAN's work cannot be quanti-
fied in dollars and cents.
As an example, Shames cites
UCAN's opposition to SDG&E's 1986
request to diversify via a holding compa-
ny structure. As a result of UCAN's
intervention, the PUC placed severe
restrictions on SDG&E's ability to
branch out into unregulated businesses.
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On the other hand, Southern California
Edison (SCE) had requested and
received PUC authorization to diversify
by establishing holding companies. The
PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates
(DRA) subsequently charged that SCE
had overcharged ratepayers $300 million
through its holding company scheme.
Shames poses the hypothetical question,
"If SDG&E had been allowed to diversi-
fy to the degree that Edison did, would
San Diego ratepayers have been over-
charged in a similar way?"78 He points
out that the effect of UCAN's interven-
tion in this case, while substantial, is vir-
tually impossible to quantify.
Recent Advocacy. Since 1988 UCAN
advocacy has focused on the attempt by
Southern California Edison to take over
SDG&E and become the largest energy
utility in the country. UCAN has
opposed the merger on grounds that
local ratepayers will be ill-served by the
merger-that rates will eventually rise
and that air quality will worsen. In
February 1991 PUC administrative law
judges recommended that the commis-
sioners reject the merger on grounds that
the mammoth utility would exert undue
anticompetitive pressures in the region.
The commisioners followed suit in May
with a 5-0 vote against the merger. The
PUC's rejection was a particularly sweet
victory for UCAN and the civic leaders
who have fought the merger against
seemingly overwhelming odds for the
past three years. The utilities spent over
$100 million on merger proceedings.
Although UCAN's primary focus has
been on energy utility cases, it has also
been active in telecommunications
issues. Since 1986 UCAN has monitored
the effect of the deregulation of tele-
phone inside wiring services on residen-
tial consumers, protesting what it
believes to be excessive and confusing
Pacific Bell service charges. UCAN has
also voiced strong opposition to the pro-
posed implementation by Pacific Bell of
"Caller ID," citing concerns about loss
of privacy by residential telephone cus-
tomers.
Illinois: A New Model for CUB
Fundraising
Origin. Illinois' volatile utilities
environment provides the backdrop for
the creation of its CUB, the third in the
nation to be formed. Ambitious pro-
grams of nuclear power plant construc-
tion by the state's largest utilities led to
dramatic increases in residential energy
rates in the mid- to late-1970s. The
demand for electricity did not material-
ize, however, and the costs of the power
plants were being borne by a smaller
number of customers than the utilities
had projected.79
Throughout this period of escalating
energy rates, consumer advocacy before
the Illinois Commerce Commission
(ICC) was limited. As a result, consumer
frustration at the ICC's inaction led to
popular support for an elected ICC. As
in Wisconsin, CUB legislation was even-
tually passed as a compromise bill, satis-
fying the proponents of an elected com-
mission while still giving consumers a
voice in utilities proceedings.
The CUB bill was not an easy victo-
ry, however. Passage of CUB legislation
was the culmination of nearly ten years
of organizing by a broad coalition of citi-
zen activists. The Labor Coalition on
Public Utilities, the Coalition for Politi-
cal Honesty and the Illinois Public
Action Council comprised a particularly
strong lobbying force for the CUB bill.
After failing three times between 1975
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and 1981, the CUB bill became law in
1983.80 It received overwhelming popu-
lar support throughout the state, with
voters in 111 communities favoring it in
advisory referenda.
Like the Wisconsin statute, the Illi-
nois bill set forth a two-fold mission for
CUB-ensuring "effective and demo-
cratic representation of utility con-
sumers" before the ICC, federal regula-
tory agencies, the judicial system and
other public bodies, as well as providing
consumer education on utility-related
issues and energy conservation.
Membership Development. In March
1984 the new consumer group convened
an interim board of directors and set
about the task of obtaining enough mem-
bers to achieve formal organizational
status. After the first enclosure was
mailed to the state's 4.5 million tele-
phone customers, 15,000 members
joined CUB. The insert exhorted, "If you
think your phone bill is too high, wait
until you see your gas, water and electric
bill! Now you can do something about it.
You can join CUB."
As in Wisconsin and San Diego,
CUB quickly obtained the required num-
ber of members (a minimum of 10,000)
to hold an election for board of directors.
In October 1984 members voted for one
director from each of Illinois' 22 con-
gressional districts; 53 candidates vied
for the positions.
Membership rose to 50,000 by the
end of 1984 and tripled the following
year to 160,000 members, an indication
of consumers' concerns over rising rates.
Membership rose to a high of 170,000 in
1986 and, except for a decline in 1987,
has remained at that level.
While the minimum membership
contribution is $5, the average contribu-
tion is closer to $10. Over the years,
CUB's operating budget has ranged
from $800,000 to a current high of $1.7
million. Of that, approximately 40% is
expended on casework, the costs of par-
ticipating in regulatory proceedings and
court challenges, primarily the expenses
of legal advisors and expert witnesses.
CUB funding is strictly membership-
based. It receives no funding from inter-
venor compensation, foundations or cor-
porate donations. Its current staff of 12
includes specialists in rate analysis, legal
and regulatory proceedings, organizing
and membership development.
With its healthy budget, strong mem-
bership base and well-rounded staff, the
Illinois CUB is able to carry out an
ambitious caseload on behalf of utility
consumers. Of all CUBs, it comes clos-
est to the ideal set forth by Nader and his
associates in the early 1970s-an orga-
nization with a broad-based and active
membership, completely independent of
government funding sources, with a suf-
ficient operating budget to aggressively
advocate for consumers.
Enclosure Setbacks and Innovative
Solutions. Between 1984 and 1986, the
practice of enclosing membership
appeals in utility billing envelopes
reaped substantial benefits for CUB. By
law CUB could enclose its own mes-
sages up to four times per year per utili-
ty. CUB took advantage of inserts
approximately 30 times, quickly draw-
ing a broad membership base from
throughout the state.
The loss of insert privileges in 1986
was a severe setback for CUB, according
to executive director Susan Stewart.
8' It
no longer had a means to replace the
members lost through the normal pro-
cess of attrition. In 1987 CUB saw its
first budget deficit. Ironically, it was also
the first year Illinois residential con-
sumers began to see rate reductions
instead of increases, due in large part to
CUB's efforts.
Help was around the corner in the
form of innovative legislation. HB401
allowed CUB to solicit members through
enclosures in state agency mailings. The
legislature overrode Governor James
Thompson's veto, and the bill took effect
in January 1988.82
The new legislation retains many of
the benefits of utility bill enclosures
while avoiding the thorny constitutional
issues raised in PG&E v. PUC. The use
of state agency mailings enables CUB to
include its messages in the envelopes of
neutral publicly-funded agencies that
play no part in utility proceedings, there-
by defusing the first amendment con-
cerns of utilities. State agency mailings
reach nearly as many residents as did the
utility mailings. And CUB has preserved
an inexpensive means to communicate
with Illinois consumers-the cost per
insert is less than two cents per flyer
compared to at least 30 cents if CUB had
to pay the full price for direct mailings.
The only disadvantage is that CUB's
message now lacks the "punch" it had
when read in conjunction with the
monthly utility bill.
CUB may enclose membership forms
up to four times per year in any state
agency mailing that exceeds 50,000
pieces. It has chosen two agency mail-
ings-motor vehicle registrations and
state income tax refunds-as those most
likely to elicit new members. The aver-
age return rate is from one-quarter to
one-half percent, bringing about 4,000
new members per month to CUB. This is
enough to compensate for the 40% of
members who do not renew their contri-
butions each year. According to associ-
ate director Martin Cohen, the enclosure
return rate is normal for untargeted mass
mailings. (Targeted mailings, on the oth-
er hand, usually draw a 2% return rate.)8 3
After the first year of state agency
mailings, CUB was back on its feet,
hailed as a "bull terrier" for consumer
rights by a Chicago Tribune correspon-
dent.84 Having lost 70,000 of its 180,000
members during 1986 and 1987, mem-
bership rose to 125,000 after the first
state agency mailing and has since lev-
eled off at about 170,000 members.
Consumer Advocacy. While the
stakes for residential consumers' inter-
ests are high in utility rate proceedings
wherever they occur, ratemaking battles
are waged on a particularly grand scale
in Illinois. Since 1984 the savings that
can be attributed to CUB's efforts are
estimated to be in the billions of dollars.
- CUB's first major victory was the
revision of the state's Public Utilities Act
in 1985.85 The act now requires energy
utilities to use the least expensive power
available and to conduct management
audits as well as audits on construction
projects. It also reorganized the ICC and
reduced the power of the chairperson.
The Office of Public Counsel was estab-
lished as part of the act, a governor-
appointed position charged with repre-
senting ratepayers in ICC and court
proceedings.
- Another 1985 victory on behalf of
consumers' pocketbooks was an Illinois
Power (IP) rate case which saved the
average consumer $150.
- In 1987 CUB convinced the ICC to
reject a $660 million Commonwealth
Edison (Com Ed) rate increase.
- CUB has won three court cases
against Com Ed, overturning rate hikes
approved by the ICC: (1) In the "Byron
I" case involving cost overruns at a
nuclear power plant, the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the ICC's
accounting methods and threw out a
$495 million rate increase granted to
Com Ed. On remand, the ICC reduced
the rate increase and ordered Coin Ed to
refund ratepayers $200 million. 86 (2)
After an 18-month battle over alleged
cost overruns at Com Ed's Byron II and
Braidwood I and II facilities, the Illinois
Supreme Court recently overturned Com
Ed's $480 million rate hike approved by
the ICC in 1988.87 Coin Ed was subse-
quently ordered to refund $250 million
to ratepayers, about $50 per residential
ratepayer, and to reduce rates by 6%.88
(3) Finally, CUB's efforts in the "sum-
mer rates" case resulted in court rejec-
tion of an ICC rate restructuring decision
which had led to a $150 million windfall
for the utility.89 Each of these rulings is
still in litigation.
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. Another drawn-out battle was
recently resolved, a 1986 class action
complaint which resulted in a 1990 ICC
order requiring Corn Ed to notify all cus-
tomers of possible overcharges in fixed
monthly service fees. Refunds could
total as much as $400 per affected cus-
tomer.
CUB's efforts on behalf of telephone
customers are less conclusive. CUB has
been only partially successful in stem-
ming the tide of mandatory local mea-
sured service. (Illinois is one of only
three states that does not have a flat rate
option.) Phone customers in the Chicago
metropolitan area and downstate areas
are charged by the length of the call, at
minimum about a nickel a call.90 CUB
did succeed in persuading the ICC to
retain the flat rate option in GTE and
Contel cases, but lost the first round
against Illinois Bell which serves 80% of
the state's customers. Because a court
rejected that ICC decision, CUB will
have another opportunity to challenge
mandatory measured rate service at an
upcoming ICC rehearing of the Illinois
Bell case. Additionally, at this writing,
CUB is supporting legislation requiring
the local telephone utilities to offer flat
rate service as an alternative to local
measured service.
Savings to Ratepayers. Savings to
residential utility customers attributable
to CUB's efforts exceed $2 billion. The
typical consumer has saved $100 to
$150 per year since CUB has been in
existence.91 Not all of CUB's work can
be easily summed up in dollars and
cents, however. It has been very active in
the legislative arena, promoting con-
sumer legislation. In addition, it has con-
sistently provided consumer education
information to its members on energy
savings techniques through newsletter
articles and fact sheets.
CUB's overall impact, according to
executive director Stewart, has been to
create heightened public awareness of
the Illinois Commerce Commission and
to encourage citizen participation.
"We're organizing consumers to more
actively participate both in the legisla-
tive process as well as the regulatory
process, explaining to them how they
can use their organized numbers to
advance their agenda or make their
agenda something that legislators or the
Commission will sit up and notice."92
Sophisticated Communications
Capabilities. CUB has emerged as the
largest consumer lobbying organization
in Illinois, according to Stewart. This is
a result of its ambitious organizing
strategies as well as its sophisticated
computer capabilities.
Since its beginning, CUB has used
the services of a professional mailing list
management firm. Stewart credits the
expertise of the firm and the capabilities
of CUB's data base with building an
extremely effective member-based lob-
bying effort. CUB's computer system
can segregate its members by the energy
and telephone utilities which serve them,
by their legislators and by the voting
records of legislators on key CUB
issues. On relatively short notice, the
system can generate personalized letters
which give CUB members explicit
instructions on how to contact their leg-
islators or ICC commissioners with spe-
cific messages. Associate director Cohen
says CUB members are prolific letter
writers. "I think the legislators groan
when they see the mailman coming
because we produce more mail than any-
body else in Springfield."
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Information Power. CUB subscribes
to the adage that information is power.
CUB's research function serves as an
antidote to a regulatory process that dis-
courages public intervention. According
to former research director Jimmie Sei-
dita, "an informed consumer is the best
consumer." Seidita believes that when
consumers are knowledgeable about util-
ities issues, they are more inclined to
take part in the regulatory process by
writing letters, visiting legislators,
attending hearings and signing petitions.
The Illinois CUB plays two roles
-and these are basically the same for all
CUBs. On the one hand, CUB partici-
pates in the regulatory arena in order to
represent the interests of ratepayers. It
has become expert in finding its way
through the maze of red tape and legal
technicalities of the regulatory process.
On the other hand, it translates the com-
plexities of the regulatory arena into lan-
guage that can be understood by layper-
sons. According to Seidita, the research
director's role is "to go between the
two-to work with the attorneys and our
experts in taking the interests of the
ratepayers and translating them into lan-
guage the commission [ICC] can under-
stand, and the flip side, to take the tech-
nical legalese and translate it for our
members in the CUB newsletter."94
Organizing Strategies. While a
major goal of CUB's consumer advoca-
cy is to reduce rates for utility ratepay-
ers, its organizing activities aim to
empower its members by both informing
them and giving them an opportunity to
participate in the regulatory process.
Organizing coordinator Seamus Glynn
explains it this way: "We are not simply
an agency that collects money and does
something without involving our mem-
bers. We essentially validate our
fundraising and casework through our
organizing."95
CUB is noted for its member
activism. It employs both direct mail and
phone banking to inform members of
timely issues and encourage them to
contact their lawmakers and commis-
sioners. The most active members com-
prise a network of at least 10,000 indi-
viduals throughout the state. Staff and
board members organize bus caravans to
take CUB members to Springfield to
meet their legislators. In January 1989,
for example, 1,000 members rallied in
the state capitol on CUB's annual lobby
day. Members also participate in rallies
on the steps of the ICC and the state
capitol when particularly controversial
measures are being considered. It is not
uncommon for several hundred CUB
members to convene for a rally or attend
a hearing.
CUB also sponsors petitions in order
to communicate to decisionmakers the
existence of broad consumer support
behind especially controversial issues. In
1987, for example, it obtained 250,000
signatures on a petition opposing a Com
Ed rate hike.
Board members are directly involved
in CUB's organizing activities. Directors
hold local meetings each year in every
district, as required by the CUB statute.
Members are informed of utility issues
of local significance and are encouraged
to participate in phone banks and to
write letters to the appropriate decision-
makers. Glynn reports that attendance at
these meetings is growing. He sees a
return of interest in collective action and
political participation.
CUB's direct organizing is backed up
with media outreach, thereby keeping
CUB's positions and activities constant-
ly before the citizens of the state. CUB's
public information officer, Patricia
Clark, releases at least one news item per
week to the 600-plus media outlets in the
state. CUB board members and staff
alike are interviewed frequently.
Glynn sums up the importance of
organizing by stressing its value in chan-
neling members' concerns. "Without
CUB, people would become very cyni-
cal. The [regulatory] process does not
consider ratepayers' interests. We in
CUB are able to say that if you partici-
pate, you will have an impact. CUB is
always able to come up with some way
that people can respond. Members can
channel their frustration and anger, and
that's what good organizing is. It gives
people something to do. It maintains
their faith."96






Oregon: A CUB Created
by Citizens Initiative
Origin. Strong public discontent for
the Oregon Public Utility Commission
(PUC) was at the heart of citizens' sup-
port for CUB. Until 1986 the PUC was
comprised of a single member, appoint-
ed by the governor. The regulatory pro-
cess allowed very little consumer repre-
sentation. As a result, PUC proceedings
heavily favored the adoption of utility
company proposals.97
Spurred by the organizing efforts of
the Oregon State Public Interest
Research Group (OSPIRG), a coalition
of consumer groups launched a success-
ful petition drive to place a CUB initia-
tive on the 1984 ballot. Despite
formidable odds-the utilities outspent
consumer groups 40-1-the initiative
passed by a margin of 53-47%. The Ore-
gon CUB was the fourth in the nation to
be formed and the first and only one to
be created by citizens initiative.
The initiative created a CUB and
authorized it to enclose membership
appeals in utility billing envelopes as
many as six times per year. CUB was
never to reap the benefit of enclosure
usage, however. A group of three utili-
ties launched a legal challenge to the ini-
tiative's enclosure provision on first
amendment grounds. In September
1985, a federal district court decided for
the utility plaintiffs, temporarily block-
ing CUB's use of bill inserts while CUB
appealed the decision to the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.98 With the
February 1986 Supreme Court decision,
CUB withdrew the appeal.
Membership Development. The sub-
sequent loss of enclosure privileges left
CUB to seek members through costlier
and less effective means-direct mail
appeals and door-to-door canvassing.
CUB obtained the requisite 5,000 mem-
bers to attain formal organizational sta-
tus in January 1986, more than a year
after the passage of the CUB initiative.
By contrast, UCAN and CUBs in Wis-
consin and Illinois met this requirement
when the first insert was mailed in utility
bills.
TheOregon CUB held its first elec-
tion for board of directors in April 1986.
Membership reached 10,000 by 1988
and grew to a high of 20,000 in 1989,
approximately 2% of Oregon's one mil-
lion ratepayer households. Although this
number has allowed CUB to be a viable
organization-albeit on a smaller scale
than the other CUBs-organizers could
have expected to draw at least twice that
many members via utility bill inserts,
based on Illinois' and Wisconsin's expe-
riences.99
CUB membership decreased to
10,000 in 1991. Door-to-door canvass-
ing, the mainstay of CUB's membership
campaign, was temporarily curtailed in
1990 as part of a comprehensive re-eval-
uation of fundraising methods. CUB will
resume both direct mail appeals and can-
vassing during 1991 in order to bolster
its membership. According to executive
director Kimberly Moore Webster, CUB
is also actively pursuing foundation
grants to supplement its operating bud-
get.
Consumer Advocacy. Despite limited
funding in its first year of operation, the
board of directors decided to forge ahead
and represent ratepayers in regulatory
and legislative proceedings. One of
CUB's first orders of business was to
lobby the legislature, in conjunction with
OSPIRG, for a three-member appointed
PUC. The legislature sent the issue to the
voters in a referendum, and it passed in
1986, a major victory for both organiza-
tions.
CUB's achievements on behalf of
consumers are impressive, especially in
light of its small budget and limited staff
resources. Former director Barbara Head
explains that CUB has had to be selec-
tive on which issues it covers. "We have
taken on more telephone than energy
cases because the telephone companies
have been really aggressive in getting
damaging 'reform' of the regulatory sys-
tem. In addition, the telephone lobbyists
have more influence on the legislature
than the energy lobbyists."10o
, In 1986 CUB convinced the PUC
that a local phone company did not need
its requested $7.4 million rate increase.
* CUB succeeded in arguing for rate
reductions totaling $37 million for both
natural gas and electricity rates in 1986.
- In 1987 CUB's largest telephone
victory resulted in the first-ever refund
to Oregon ratepayers. ClUB argued
before the PUC for a $45 1,i"ion reduc-
tion in telephone rates. As a resuli, US
West refunded $14 to each customer, and
the phone companies had to reduce rates
by $2 each month.
- CUB joined a coalition which
pushed "lifeline" rates through the legis-
lature in 1987, obtaining lower phone
rates for low-income households.
- In CUB's biggest energy utility vic-
tory, the PUC ordered a $127 million
rate reduction for Portland General Elec-
tric (PGE) in 1987.
CUB currently has a staff of two and
an annual operating budget of $150,000.
Dedicated supporters contribute a con-
siderable amount of pro bono legal
expertise. In fact, about 70% of CUB's
legal work is donated.
Savings to Ratepayers. In all, CUB's
advocacy has resulted in refunds and
reductions totaling nearly $124 million.
CUB asserts that from 1984 to 1989, it
saved Oregon ratepayers $318 for every
$1 of membership dues spent. It is cur-
rently challenging another $174 million
in proposed rate increases.
A nonquantifiable benefit of CUB,
according to former director Head, is the
kind of appointments made to the PUC
and the tenor of its decisions. Under the
former one-member system, PUC rate
regulation was essentially a "rubber-
stamp process which favored the utili-
ties. Now the process is more
balanced."101
Current Activities. Current CUB
advocacy continues to focus on tele-
phone issues, according to executive
director Kimberly Moore Webster. CUB
has challenged two US West policies
that directly affect low-income cus-
tomers. It has protested a new phone
company policy in which the owners of
neighborhood pay stations (usually
located in convenience stores) are no
longer paid to collect phone bills. This
has resulted in the closure of pay stations
which are located primarily in low-
income neighborhoods where phone
company customers are more likely to
make last-minute "payday" bill pay-
ments.
CUB has also filed a complaint with
the PUC about the phone company's pol-
icy of charging libraries for phone direc-
tories, a practice which results in many
public libraries no longer carrying the
phone books of other Oregon communi-
ties. To many library users, out-of-town
phone books represent free do-it-your-
self directory assistance for long dis-
tance calls. CUB will also continue to
intervene in rate cases of both the tele-
phone and energy utilities as they arise.
CUB's long-term goal is to triple its
current operating budget to $500,000 so
it can substantially increase its caseload.
Executive director Webster states that in
addition to expanding its membership
base, CUB will also seek the passage of
intervenor compensation legislation in
order to obtain reimbursement for its
advocacy on behalf of consumers.
Although supported by the PUC com-
missioners, intervenor compensation
legislation has failed three times in the




Despite overwhelming popular sup-
port, efforts to establish a New York
CUB in the early 1980s did not succeed.
Working with a coalition of over sixty





organizations, the New York Public
Interest Research Group (NYPIRG) gar-
nered strong grassroots support for CUB
legislation. Governor Mario Cuomo sent
CUB legislation to the state assembly as
one of his high priority "program bills"
in 1983. The bill passed the state assem-
bly but was derailed by the senate.1
02
Governor Cuomo then sought alter-
nate means to create a CUB. He asked
the Public Service Commission (PSC) to
authorize a CUB through administrative
action. The PSC held hearings through-
out the state and subsequently permitted
the formation of a CUB in May 1984.103
The PSC concluded that providing
ratepayer access to utility billing
envelopes is in the public interest and
that the Commission was within its legal
authority to require utilities to provide
access for this purpose.
A coalition of twenty consumer orga-
nizations incorporated as the New York
Citizens' Utility Board (NYCUB) and
applied to the PSC for access to utility
billing envelopes in October 1984. The
PSC was expected to act favorably on its
request. At the same time, seven utilities
filed suit to block PSC action, contend-
ing that the enclosure privilege violated
their first amendment rights, was an ille-
gal taking of their property and exceeded
the PSC's statutory jurisdiction.
CUB formation was put on hold to
await the state court decision. In April
1985 the New York Supreme Court
invalidated the PSC's access authoriza-
tion as an infringement on the utilities'
first and fourteenth amendment rights. 04
The PSC, NYCUB and others appealed
the decision to the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court. Shortly after the
U.S. Supreme Court released its PG&E
decision in February 1986, the Appellate
Division upheld the lower court's ruling,
citing the first amendment issues raised
in PG&E.105
NYPIRG continued to work closely
with Governor Cuomo and his adminis-
tration-to revive the CUB concept. Cuo-
mo introduced a modified CUB bill in
the 1989 legislative session which had
been amended to incorporate the Illinois
practice of enclosing membership
appeals in state agency mailings. When
that failed, he explored ways to establish
a CUB through administrative action.
In January 1991 Cuomo signed an
executive order that paves the way for
the formation of a CUB to represent resi-
dential utility customers in regulatory
proceedings.106 The order grants access
by a CUB to state agency mailings up to
four times per year in order to solicit
membership contributions. Mailing
envelope access is allowed for three
years after a permanent board of direc-
tors is elected, although the CUB may
petition the PSC for an extension.
The specifications for CUB enclo-
sures are similar to the Illinois program.
CUB is not required to reimburse the
state agency for postage as long as the
enclosure does not increase the cost of
the mailing. The content of CUB mes-
sages is limited to an explanation of
CUB's purposes, activities and achieve-
ments; a statement which specifies that
CUB is a nonprofit, democratically gov-
erned organization with no ties to utility
companies or government entities; and
information on how one can become a
member of CUB.
A New York CUB is expected to
begin operating by late 1991, the fifth
such consumer organization in the coun-
try and the second to take advantage of
state agency mailings for membership
and fundraising appeals.
Next Issue
The profiles of CUBs in Wisconsin,
California, Illinois and Oregon portray
consumer organizations that-despite
the loss of their primary means of raising
funds, utility bill inserts-have contin-
ued to effectively represent residential
utility customers in regulatory proceed-
ings. Part II of this report, scheduled to
appear in the Summer 1991 issue of the
California Regulatory Law Reporter,
discusses structural issues, including
funding options, models of governance
and other applications of the CUB con-
cept.
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